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Problem area 
With the steady increase in air 
traffic, airports are under 
continuous pressure to increase 
aircraft handling capacity. One 
potential approach is to reduce the 
wake vortex separation distance 
between aircraft at take-off and 
landing without compromising 
safety. The European Commission 
Information Society Technologies 
project ATC-Wake has designed an 
integrated system for Air Traffic 
Control that would allow variable 
aircraft separation distances, as 
opposed to the fixed distances 
presently applied at airports. 
Introducing and/or planning 
changes to the ATM system cannot 
be done without providing 
sufficiently validated evidence that 
minimum safety requirements will 
be satisfied. 
 
Description of work 
This study has quantified the 
possible safety implications related 
to installation of ATC-Wake. This 
includes an assessment of required 
crosswind values for which reduced 
aircraft separation can be applied. 
The wake vortex induced risk 
between a variety of leader and 
follower aircraft, departing under 
various wind conditions, has been 
evaluated with the Wake Vortex 
Induced Risk assessment (WAVIR) 
methodology and toolset. For the 
ATC-Wake departure operation 
with reduced separation, two more 
issues have been considered: 
• The controller working with 
ATC-Wake will warn the pilot 
about a potential wake vortex 
encounter, in case an ATC-
Wake alert is raised. 
• If the ATC-Wake system 
provides wrong advice, there is 
a higher risk on the presence of 
severe wake vortices. 
Consequences might even be 
catastrophic when reduced 
separation is applied and a light 
aircraft encounters a severe 
wake of a heavy aircraft. 
 
Results and conclusions 
The present separation of two to 
three minutes between departing 
aircraft is designed to ensure that 
aircraft will not encounter wake 
vortices of large aircraft. For 
airports with ATC-Wake in use, the 
present study indicates that the time 
separation between aircraft 
departing at single runways might 
be reduced to 90 seconds for all 
aircraft types in the presence of 
sufficient crosswind. Indicative 
separation minima dependent on 
crosswind conditions have been 
determined. As these separation 
minima do not yet account for 
crosswind uncertainty, the setting of 
UNCLASSIFIED 
 
 
 
UNCLASSIFIED 
 
Safety assessment of ATC-Wake single runway departures 
  
Nationaal Lucht- en Ruimtevaartlaboratorium, National Aerospace Laboratory NLR
 
Anthony Fokkerweg 2, 1059 CM Amsterdam, 
P.O. Box 90502, 1006 BM  Amsterdam, The Netherlands 
Telephone +31 20 511 31 13, Fax +31 20 511 32 10, Web site: www.nlr.nl 
requirements for the ATC-Wake 
system was further investigated. 
This was done through a qualitative 
analysis of the effect of failures of 
the ATC-Wake system. It was 
concluded that the Monitoring and 
Alerting system and Meteorological 
Forecast and Now-casting systems 
are crucial and sufficient accuracy 
and reliability shall be guaranteed. 
Additionally, it is noted that 
controllers shall be made very 
aware that a timely warning to the 
pilots is also crucial (safety training 
might help to increase awareness). 
During the validation activities, it 
was concluded that both real 
(measured) data and a sufficiently 
validated aircraft performance and 
dynamics model for departures are 
not yet available. It is therefore 
recommended to extend the well 
known AMAAI toolset (developed 
for EUROCONTROL) for the 
analysis of in trail following aircraft 
during arrivals with a module 
dedicated to departure operations. 
 
Applicability 
A full Safety Case for ATC-Wake 
departures shall also account for the 
local weather climatology and 
ATC/pilot procedures for wake 
vortex mitigation. In view of this, 
actual implementation of the ATC-
Wake operation at European 
airports is not envisaged in the short 
term. It is recommended to involve 
airport authorities and ATC centers 
for gathering the required data to 
build the Safety Case. Follow-up 
research is foreseen to be performed 
as part of the CREDOS project, 
which is a logical successor of 
ATC-Wake. 
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Summary 
With the steady increase in air traffic, airports are under continuous pressure to increase aircraft 
handling capacity. The EC IST project ATC-Wake aims to develop and build an integrated 
system for Air Traffic Control (ATC) that allows variable aircraft separation distances, as 
opposed to the fixed times presently applied at airports. Introducing and/or planning changes to 
the ATM system cannot be done without providing sufficiently validated evidence that 
minimum safety requirements will be satisfied. Therefore, this study quantifies the possible 
safety implications to be obtained by installation of ATC-Wake. This includes an assessment of 
required crosswind values for which reduced aircraft separation can be applied. The wake 
vortex induced risk between a variety of leader and follower aircraft, departing under various 
wind conditions, has been evaluated with the Wake Vortex Induced Risk assessment (WAVIR) 
methodology and toolset. For airports with ATC-Wake in use, the present study indicates that 
the time separation between aircraft departing at single runways might be reduced from two to 
three minutes to 90 seconds for all aircraft types in the presence of sufficient crosswind.  
 
Indicative separation minima dependent on crosswind conditions are determined. As these 
separation minima do not yet account for crosswind uncertainty, the setting of requirements for 
the ATC-Wake system is further investigated. This is done through a qualitative analysis of the 
effect of failures of the ATC-Wake system, assuming that failure conditions with severe 
consequences must be extremely improbable and minor failure conditions may be probable. It is 
concluded that the ATC-Wake Monitoring and Alerting system and Meteorological Forecast 
and Now-casting systems are crucial and sufficient accuracy and reliability shall be guaranteed. 
The need for follow-up research is identified, and recommendations for improvements and 
validation of the safety assessment models are given.  
 
A full Safety Case for ATC-Wake departures shall also account for the local weather 
climatology and ATC/pilot procedures for wake vortex mitigation. In view of this, actual 
implementation of the ATC-Wake operation at European airports is not envisaged in the short 
term. It is recommended to involve airport authorities and ATC centres for gathering the 
required data to build the Safety Case. Follow-up research is foreseen to be performed as part of 
the CREDOS project, which is a logical successor to the ATC-Wake project. 
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Abbreviations 
AMAAI  Modelling toolset for analysis of in-trail following aircraft dynamics 
ATC   Air Traffic Control 
ATCO   Air Traffic Controller 
ATC-WAKE  Integrated ATC Wake Vortex Safety and Capacity System (EU project) 
ATFM   Air Traffic Flow Management 
BADA   Eurocontrol Base of Aircraft Data 
CAS   Calibrated Air Speed 
CREDOS  Crosswind Reduced Separations for Departure Operations (EU project) 
EC   European Commission 
EDR   Eddy Dissipation Rate 
ERCR   Extended Roll Control Ratio 
ETA   Estimated Time of Arrival 
ETD   Estimated Time of Departure 
FAC   Follower Aircraft 
FAR   Federal Aviation Regulations 
FL   Flight Level 
GND   Ground Controller 
HMI   Human Machine Interface 
ICAO   International Civil Aviation Organization 
IST   Information Society Technologies 
LAC   Leader Aircraft 
MTOW   Maximum Take Off Weight 
NLR   Netherlands National Aerospace Laboratory  
NM   Nautical Mile 
QSA   Qualitative Safety Assessment methodology 
RAPM   Reduced Aircraft Pilot Model 
SID   Standard Instrument Departure 
SRD   Single Runway Departure 
S-WAKE  Assessment of Wake Vortex Safety (EU project) 
TWR   Tower Controller 
UK   United Kingdom 
USA   United States 
WAVIR  Wake Vortex Induced Risk assessment methodology 
WV   Wake Vortex 
WVV   Wake Vortex Vector 
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1 Introduction 
With the steady increase in air traffic, airports are under continuous pressure to increase aircraft 
handling capacity. One potential approach is to reduce the wake vortex separation distances 
between aircraft at take-off without compromising safety. The ATC-Wake project aims to 
develop and build an integrated system for Air Traffic Control (ATC) that would allow variable 
aircraft wake vortex separation distances, as opposed to the fixed times presently applied at 
airports. The present separation of two to three minutes between departing aircraft is designed to 
counter problems aircraft may encounter in the wake of large aircraft. For airports with ATC-
Wake in use, the aim is to reduce the time separation between aircraft departing at single 
runways to 90 seconds for all aircraft types in the presence of sufficient crosswind.  
 
The overall objective of this study is to quantify the possible safety implications of using the 
ATC-Wake system and to assess the required crosswind values for which the “ATC-Wake 
mode”, with reduced aircraft separation during departures, can be applied (for a safety analysis 
of the ATC-Wake single runway arrival operation, see reference 23). The wake vortex induced 
risk between a variety of leader and follower aircraft, departing under various wind conditions, 
will be evaluated. For the risk assessment of the ATC-Wake departure operation with reduced 
separation, three main issues have to be considered: 
• The controller working with ATC-Wake will warn the pilot about a potential wake vortex 
encounter, in case an ATC-Wake alert is raised. 
• If an ATC-Wake system component provides wrong advice, there is a higher risk on the 
presence of severe wake vortices. Consequences might even be catastrophic when reduced 
separation is applied and a light aircraft encounters a severe wake of a heavy aircraft. 
• The actual (real) separation time at start of roll will usually not be exactly the same as the 
separation time advised by the ATC-Wake system. 
 
Introducing and/or planning changes to the ATM system cannot be done without showing that 
minimum safety requirements will be satisfied. This will be supported by a quantitative safety 
assessment, based on the WAVIR methodology and toolset (see Speijker [9, 10, 19] and Section 
3). The effect of failures of the ATC-Wake system and hazards related to the ATC-Wake 
operation will be investigated in a qualitative way, with the assumption that failure and/or 
hazard conditions with severe consequences must be extremely improbable. 
 
Section 2 describes the ATC-Wake single runway departure operation. Section 3 describes the 
risk assessment methodology. Section 4 contains a description of the simulation scenarios. Risk 
assessment results are presented Section 5. Section 6 presents the conclusions and 
recommendations. 
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2 Single runway departure operation 
2.1 Current practice regulations and recommendations 
In current ATC operations, there is no exchange of information concerning wake vortices 
between aircrew and ATC. Control practices are based on ICAO recommendations and national 
regulation. ICAO separation minima between aircraft are based on Maximum Take-Off Weight 
(MTOW) of the involved aircraft, distinguishing categories Light, Medium, and Heavy [7]. 
National regulation exists in the USA and UK. ICAO non-radar separation minima for take off, 
as applied to aircraft operating behind larger aircraft are presented in Table 2-1. The separation 
is 3 minutes in case the take off is from an intermediate position on the runway. In all cases, it is 
up to the pilot to decide whether or not to initiate the take off (start of roll). 
 
Table 2-1  ICAO non-radar separation minima 
Aircraft category Non-radar separation minima 
Leading aircraft Following aircraft Departing 
MEDIUM  2 minutes HEAVY  
LIGHT  2 minutes 
MEDIUM LIGHT  2 minutes 
 
Separation minima of 3 minutes for departing aircraft apply in case of: 
 take-off from an intermediate part of the same runway; or 
 take-off from an intermediate part of a parallel runway separated by less than 760 m, see 
Figure 2-1 below. 
 
 
Figure 2-1  Three minutes separation for departing aircraft 
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2.2 The ATC-Wake departure operation 
The objective of the ATC-Wake project was to develop and build an innovative platform with 
the aim of optimizing safety and capacity. The platform serves as a test bed to assess the 
interoperability of the ATC-Wake system with existing ATC systems currently used at various 
European airports, to assess the safety and capacity improvements that can be obtained by 
applying the system in airport environments, and to evaluate its operational usability and 
acceptability by pilots and controllers [1, 2, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18]. The ATC-Wake operation 
consists of two phases that can be summarised as follows [1]: 
 Planning Phase or Sequencing: wake vortex prediction information is used together with 
aircraft separation rules to establish the departure sequence; 
 Tactical Phase: wake vortex detection information is used to prevent wake vortex 
encounter during the take-off phase (up to the end of the initial climb). 
 
In the ATC-Wake operation for single runway departures, two separation modes are defined: 
 The baseline mode with ICAO wake vortex separation minima; 
 The ATC-Wake separation mode with (reduced) separation minima that depend on the 
weather conditions but do not depend on aircraft wake vortex category. 
 
For departures, ATC-Wake operations will start at the beginning of the taxi phase and finish at 
the end of the initial climb phase, including the initiation of the first turn. Wake vortex 
prediction and detection will cover those areas where the risk of encountering a wake vortex is 
expected to be relatively high, see Table 2-2. For departures this concerns the area 
encompassing rotation points (second half of the runway) (Figure 2-2) and the area 
encompassing the first turn in the climb phase (note that noise abatement procedures might be 
applicable). 
 
Table 2-2  Wake vortex prediction and detection areas 
Type of Area Description Position and Size 
Departure Area 1 Area encompassing rotation points 
 
Position: 2nd half of the runway 
Length: 2000m 
Height: 100 ft 
Departure Area 2 Area encompassing first turn in 
climb phase, e.g. noise abatement 
procedures 
Position: at 10 NM from runway 
Length: To be determined 
Height: 3000 – 6000 ft 
 
The risk of wake vortex encounters exists if the aircraft have the same rotation point or if the 
second aircraft takes off after the rotation point of the first aircraft. The case that a light or 
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medium aircraft encounters a wake vortex generated by the departure of a heavy aircraft can for 
instance occur when an intermediate runway take-off is performed by a medium or light aircraft. 
Important wake vortex detection and prediction areas that are to be considered are listed in 
Table 2-2. The detection is performed along the extension of the runway axis and approximately 
up to a distance of 10 NM from the runway. 
 
Heavy Aircraft
Light Aircraft
 
Figure 2-2  Departure rotation points and climb profiles 
 
This initial concept assumes that the first turn takes place at about 10 NM from the runway, 
mainly due to noise abatement procedures. As noise abatement procedures are airport 
dependent, so is this location where the first turn can be initiated. Furthermore, this location 
may vary per Standard Instrument Departure (SID) and depend on the aircraft climb rate.  
 
The ATC-Wake departure operation will influence the roles and responsibilities of the involved 
actors. Identified actors are ATC supervisor, the Ground Controller, Tower Controller and the 
aircrew. Table 2-3 presents an overview of these actors with their current responsibility and 
their specific and/or additional role in the ATC-Wake single runway departure operation. 
 
Table 2-3  Overview of human actors in the ATC-Wake departure operation 
Actor Current Responsibility Specific/additional Role in ATC– Wake 
ATC supervisor Monitors ATC tower and 
ground operations. 
Decision on arrival and departure rate to be applied. 
Ground Controller 
(GND) 
Sequences departures 
according to landings. 
Use wake vortex detection information to optimise 
departure sequencing. 
Tower Controller 
(TWR) 
In charge of final approach, 
landing and takeoff phases. 
Uses wake vortex detection information (now cast) to 
monitor safe separations between aircraft in the 
departure phase (up to the first turn) using a vortex 
vector (display of wake vortex). On basis of wake 
detection information, the aircraft separation time 
between departures can be increased. 
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Actor Current Responsibility Specific/additional Role in ATC– Wake 
Aircrew Overall responsible for a safe 
and efficient flight. 
Judges ATC instructions and, if considered safe, will 
attempt to comply, taking into consideration all factors 
that may influence the safe continuation of the flight. 
In case of incompliance, the pilot should file a report 
to explain his rationale. 
 
Note that an initial climb out profile is chosen by the aircrew from various options. Noise 
abatement procedures do not overrule the climb out profiles as this would have a direct effect on 
the safe operation of the flight. It is assumed that ATC-Wake mode is only applied for 
departures if radar identification of aircraft is available at less than 1 NM from the runway. 
When the ATC-Wake separation mode is in operation, a separation of 90 seconds (wake vortex 
transport out of runway area confirmed by detection) between two departures is envisaged. This 
separation time should take into account the possibility of intersection take-offs. The following 
chronological order can be identified for the ATC-Wake operation for single runway departures: 
1. Based on meteorological conditions and runway configuration, the ATC-Wake system will 
advise the ATC supervisor about applicable separation mode for a certain runway and 
associated validity period. 
2. The ATC supervisor decides on the separation mode, also taking into account runway 
configuration and conditions. In case of ATC-Wake mode, the ATC supervisor decides on 
the separation time between two consecutive departures. 
3. The Ground Controller determines the departure sequence taking into account Air Traffic 
Flow Management (ATFM) slots, departure routes, climb out speeds, and in addition wake 
vortex prediction information.  
4. The Tower Controller uses wake vortex detection information (now cast) to monitor safe 
separations between aircraft in the departure phase (up to the first turn) using a vortex 
vector (display of wake vortex). On basis of wake vortex detection information separation 
time between departures can be increased. 
W ind
T ypica l Dis tance : 10  N M  
Figure 2-3  Example of vortex vectors for departures 
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The ATC-Wake system will include four main specific (functional) components (see Table 2-4 
and Figure 2-4), which will also interface with several existing ATC system components. 
 
Table 2-4  ATC-Wake System Components 
ATC-Wake 
Separation Mode 
Planner 
Determines applicable separation mode (ICAO or ATC-Wake mode) 
and advises about minimum aircraft separation distance. The advisory 
includes expected time for future mode transitions, and an indication of 
the aircraft separation minimum applicable 
ATC-Wake 
Predictor 
Predicts for individual aircraft the WV behaviour (“Wake Vortex Vector”) 
in the pre-defined departure area(s). The Wake Vortex Vector (WVV) is 
part of the critical area potentially affected by the wake vortex. 
ATC-Wake Detector Detects for individual aircraft WV position, extent (“vortex vector”) and –if possible – also its strength in the critical area.  
ATC-Wake 
Monitoring and 
Alerting 
Alerts ATCO in case of : 
• significant deviation between WV detection and WV prediction 
information which raises the risk of WV encounter 
• failure of one or several WV components 
 
The ATC-Wake system will interface with existing ATC systems, as shown in Table 2-5. 
 
Table 2-5  Existing ATC Systems interfacing with ATC-Wake components 
ATCO HMI Provides the traffic situation picture and automated support for various ATCO tactical roles (Approach, Tower). 
Flight Data 
Processing System 
Keeps track of flight information and updates, in particular flight plan, 
the trajectory prediction, ETA and ETD, aircraft type and equipment 
Surveillance System Provides and maintains the air traffic situation picture using all available detection means (radars, air-ground data links) 
 
  
NLR-TP-2006-465 
 
  13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-4  ATC-Wake Operational System and its functional flow during the departures 
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3 Risk assessment methodology 
Evaluation of wake vortex separation distances has historically been conducted using three 
approaches: (1) experimental flight test data, (2) historic operational data, and (3) analytical 
models. As the ATC-Wake system and operation is still in the design phase, this study follows 
the third approach. The intention is to build sufficient safety confidence, enabling the decision 
makers to decide on operational testing and implementation. A probabilistic safety analysis is 
conducted for a traffic mix of aircraft departing under different weather conditions flying flight 
paths with statistical variations, taking into account stochastic models of wake vortex 
generation, wake vortex encounter, and aircraft/pilot and controller responses. For the risk 
assessment of the ATC-Wake departure operation, three main issues have to be considered:  
• The controller working with ATC-Wake will warn the pilot about a potential wake vortex 
encounter, in case an ATC-Wake alert is raised. 
• If an ATC-Wake system component provides wrong advice, there is a higher risk on the 
presence of severe wake vortices. Consequences might even be catastrophic when reduced 
separation is applied and a light aircraft encounters a severe wake of a heavy aircraft. 
• The actual (real) separation time at start of roll will usually not be exactly the same as the 
separation time advised by the ATC-Wake system. 
 
This study considers the first two main issues (the third issue is recommended for follow-up 
research). The risk assessment is performed in two (sequential) steps: 
1. Assess wake vortex induced risk in the case of failure of the ATC-Wake system. The 
WAVIR methodology is used to determine indicative separation minima dependent on 
crosswind conditions. In this worst case situation, no wake vortex avoidance manoeuvre is 
performed by the aircraft/pilot. The uncertainty in flight path and speed of involved aircraft 
are modeled in the flight path evolution model. The nominal flight trajectories are based on 
the EUROCONTROL Base of Aircraft Data (BADA, Revision 3.6). The uncertainty about 
the flight trajectories is based on statistical analysis of aircraft departing at Schiphol airport. 
The resulting probability distributions of aircraft speed and position are used in the Monte 
Carlo simulations with the wake vortex evolution and wake encounter models. The resulting 
probabilities of an encounter in a predefined encounter severity class are used by the risk 
prediction model to come up with incident/accident risk probabilities. The predicted risk 
associated for each of four pre-defined risk events (minor incident, major incident, 
hazardous accident, and catastrophic accident) is the end-result of a WAVIR assessment for 
a specific scenario. These risk numbers can then be compared with risk requirements to 
judge whether or not an evaluated scenario is safe. Risk event definitions and risk 
requirements have been defined during the S-Wake project [9, 10]. The assessment of the 
wake vortex induced risk is carried out with the risk assessment model described in Speijker 
[19]. 
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2. Investigate the setting of requirements for the ATC-Wake system. As the indicative 
separation minima determined in Step 1 do not yet account for crosswind uncertainty and 
the effect of failures of the ATC-Wake system, a qualitative analysis of ATC-Wake system 
failures is performed. Requirements can be determined under the assumption that failure 
conditions with severe consequences must be extremely improbable and minor failure 
conditions may be probable. 
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4 Description of scenarios 
The setup of the simulation scenarios focuses on wake vortices generated during departures, 
such that the vortices of the leader aircraft are transported into the flight path of the follower 
aircraft. Basically, only the first 10 NM after take off is considered, without initiation of a turn 
within this area. A scenario is defined by all the parameters and variables in the WAVIR tool-
set. Basically, the scenarios only differ in the so-called 'assessment parameters': 
• Generator – follower aircraft combination; 
• Crosswind; 
• Lift off point; 
• Initial aircraft separation time. 
 
Table 4-1  Assessment parameters for the Single Runway Departure (SRD) operation 
    Assessment Scenarios   
    1 through 96 97 through 192 193 through 288 
Leading A/C LAC1 LAC3 LAC7 
Follower A/C FAC1, 4, 5, 8 FAC1, 4, 5, 8 FAC1, 4, 5, 8 
Lift Off Point LAC Early, Late Early, Late Early, Late 
Lift Off Point FAC Early, Late Early, Late Early, Late 
(Cross)wind [m/s] 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 A
ss
es
sm
en
t 
pa
ra
m
et
er
s 
Separation [s] 60, 90, 120, 150, 180 60, 90, 120, 150, 180 60, 90, 120, 150, 180 
 
Table 4-2  Aircraft characteristics (from EUROCONTROL BADA, Revision 3.6) 
# Name 
IC
A
O
 C
A
T 
H
igh M
ass 
Level  on 
Take O
ff [kg] 
N
om
inal M
ass 
Level on 
Take off [kg] 
W
ingspan [m
] 
True Air Speed 
at FL=0 (kts) 
V
 stall (C
A
S
), 
at Take O
ff [kts] 
V
 stall (C
A
S
), 
Initial C
lim
b [kts] 
1 Large jumbo jet H 372000 300000 60 186 140 149 
2 Wide body jet (1) H 287000 208700 60 157 117 125 
7 Wide body jet (2) H 181400 150000 45 164 122 136 
3 Medium jet M 68000 58000 36 168 125 131 
4 Regional jet M 43090 38000 30 148 110 110 
5 Med turbo prop M 20820 18000 30 132 86 92 
8 Light Business Jet  L 6025 6000 16 122 90 90 
6 Light Turbo Prop L 4700 4100 14 123 79 83 
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The rotation points for the different aircraft types depend on several factors, including take off 
weight, engines, wind, air temperature and pressure, runway characteristics, and thrust settings. 
A de-rated take off, using the extra available length of a runway, is often applied by the pilot to 
minimize the load on the engines (to increase their life time). The following is assumed (see 
also Table 4-3): 
• The Minimum Lift Off Point is smaller than the Take Off Length, and estimated for a non 
de-rated take off using expert opinion. 
• The Maximum Lift Off Point of an aircraft departing is estimated using expert opinion, i.e. 
operational expert interviews. 
• The Take Off Position of leader and follower are both equal to the Runway Threshold.  
 
Table 4-3  Estimated lift off points of different aircraft types (at Schiphol runway 24) 
# Name CAT Take Off Length 
Early Lift Off Point 
(non-derated take off) 
Late Lift Off Point 
(e.g. using intersection 
take off or derated) 
1 Large Jumbo Jet H 3320 2100 3000 
2 Wide Body Jet (1) H 2925 2000 2700 
7 Wide Body Jet (2) H 2700 1900 2500 
3 Medium Jet M 2500 1500 2300 
4 Regional Jet M 1715 1200 2200 
5 Medium turbo prop M 940 700 1800 
8 Light Business Jet L 727 600 1600 
6 Light Turbo Prop L 506 400 1400 
 
Figure 4-1 shows the vertical profile for different types of aircraft, where the longitudinal axis 
specifies the distance from threshold. It is assumed that the aircraft follow a 'nominal' climb 
profile, as specified in BADA 3.6, i.e. in reality the climb rate could be higher or lower than 
used. The aircraft speed profiles and climb rates are generated using the BADA, which provides 
Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) Take Off Length, True Air Speed (TAS) and rate of climb 
for a specified flight level. Combining these numbers, one can compute height and longitudinal 
position as a function of time for different kinds of aircraft performing a departure. 
 
The vortex pair behind the generator aircraft is modeled as two line vortices with a vortex 
spacing, a vortex strength, and a core-radius. These parameters do depend on the wingspan, 
weight and speed of the generator aircraft. Evolution of the vortex position is modeled 
according to Corjon & Poinsot [4]. This includes image vortices and secondary vortices making 
the vortex pair to diverge and rebound near the ground respectively. The decay function as 
defined by Sarpkaya [8] is used. Input parameters are Brunt-Väissällä frequency N and Eddy 
Dissipation Rate EDR. Simulations are performed for a two-dimensional data set of Brunt-
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Väisälä frequencies and EDR values representing the climatology of London Heathrow at 
different height levels. Information on this climatology was provided by UK Met Office [5, 9]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-1  Vertical profiles of departing aircraft types based on the BADA database 
 
Two encounter models are available, the Extended Roll Control Ratio model (ERCR) (based on 
[15] and the Reduced Aircraft Pilot Model (RAPM) (see Speijker [19]). The aircraft dependent 
parameters for the ERCR and RAPM model are determined for a number of generic aircraft 
types. In this study, the ERCR has been applied to compute the roll control ratio and the 
maximum bank angle. The RAPM was used to verify and calibrate the ERCR model. Wind is 
simulated assuming a logarithmic wind profile up to an altitude of 1000 ft. Above 1000 ft the 
wind is assumed to be constant (this is more or less in line with a logarithmic wind profile). The 
surface roughness is 0.03 m, which is representative for a generic airport environment. The 
wind value is specified at 10 m altitude. Analysis of wake induced risk is done in a number of 
longitudinal positions up to 10 NM from the runway threshold, with a focus on the critical 
areas: the area close to the ground and the area encompassing the first turn in the climb phase. 
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5 Risk assessment 
5.1 Qualitative risk assessment 
 
Table 5-1 provides an assessment of the effect of the ATC-Wake system component failures. 
The individual classifications are in accordance with the risk classification scheme provided in 
reference 6 and are based on the assumption that other failure conditions do not occur. A 
simultaneous failure of two system components could aggravate the situation. Failure conditions 
with severe consequences must be extremely improbable and minor failure conditions may be 
probable. A potential safety issue is that shortly after take off, at low altitudes, it will not be 
feasible for the pilot to turn away from the vortex of a preceding aircraft. Provision of up-to-
date meteorological now-casting information to ATCOs is crucial in order to support the pilot to 
prepare for a potential wake encounter in case of a sudden change of wind. From the individual 
classifications in Table 5-1, it appears that the most severe failure conditions are related to the 
functioning of the Monitoring and Alerting system and the Meteorological Now-casting 
systems. These system components are crucial and sufficient accuracy and reliability shall be 
guaranteed. Additionally, it is noted that controllers should be made very aware that a timely 
warning to the pilots is also crucial (safety training might help to increase the awareness). 
 
Table 5-1  Effect of main ATC-Wake system/operation failure conditions 
Description Effect Classification Comment 
Pilot/aircraft not able to turn 
timely:  
The pilot/aircraft is not able to 
timely perform an avoidance 
maneouvre, after it is 
requested by the controller. 
This could occur in case of a 
warning when the aircraft is 
still in initial take off, i.e. 
limitations in bank angle will 
apply. 
An unfavorable change of 
weather (not enough 
crosswind) is passed on by 
the controller to the pilot. The 
pilot is prepared for a potential 
severe wake encounter, and 
may be able to control the 
situation. Nevertheless, 
control problems in close 
proximity to ground could 
occur for light aircraft. 
MAJOR –  
SERIOUS 
INCIDENT 
The wake vortex is 
stronger closer to the 
generating aircraft. An 
encounter with 90 
seconds separation will 
result in more severe 
consequence than in 
ICAO Mode. The pilot 
is prepared for a Wake 
Vortex Encounter. 
Controller does not provide 
a timely warning to the 
pilot:  
ATCo does not provide a 
timely warning to the pilot, for 
example because he does not 
hear an aural warning or 
misses a visual warning. ATC-
Wake provides an alert, but 
ATCo is not aware of it and 
does not ask the pilot to 
initiate a turn. 
An unfavorable change of 
weather (not enough 
crosswind) is not passed on to 
the pilot. The pilot will be 
unprepared for severe 
turbulence, i.e might 
experience control problems 
in close proximity to the 
ground. 
SERIOUS  
INCIDENT 
The wake vortex is 
stronger closer to the 
generating aircraft. An 
encounter with 90 
seconds (i.e. reduced) 
separation will result in 
more severe 
consequence than 
under ICAO 
separations.  
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Description Effect Classification Comment 
Loss of Monitoring and 
Alerting Function:  
The ATC-Wake Monitoring 
and Alerting system is not 
operational and provides no 
function. The controllers, not 
being aware of it, are 
expecting the system to warn 
in case of a discrepancy 
between prediction and 
detection information. 
The controllers will not receive 
an alert in case ATC-Wake 
separation is no longer 
suitable. The aircraft may 
encounter severe turbulence 
which may lead to control 
problems in close proximity to 
the ground. 
 
SERIOUS  
INCIDENT 
The wake vortex is 
stronger closer to the 
generating aircraft. An 
encounter with 90 
seconds (i.e. reduced) 
separation will result in 
more severe 
consequence than 
under ICAO 
separations. 
Faulty or Inaccurate WV 
Model Estimation:  
The predictions of wake 
vortex locations and/or 
strengths made by the WV 
Model, on the basis of aircraft 
data and meteorological data 
are inaccurate/wrong.  
Incorrect information is 
passed to the ATC-Wake 
Predictor, causing improper 
functioning. The predicted 
Wake Vortex Vector will be 
wrong, and an alert might be 
generated on the basis of 
false information. There will 
be an increase of workload. 
SIGNIFICANT –
MAJOR  
INCIDENT 
Alert is generated 
because there is a 
discrepancy between 
prediction and 
detection information 
(unlikely to occur at low 
altitudes if Meteo 
Nowcast and Predictor 
are working). 
Faulty or Inaccurate Air 
Traffic Situation 
The air traffic situation 
provided by the surveillance 
systems is wrong or 
inaccurate. The controllers will 
most likely not be aware that 
the wrong leader aircraft type 
(or associated data) is used in 
the ATC-Wake Predictor and 
on the HMI. 
Incorrect information is 
passed to the ATC-Wake 
Predictor, causing improper 
functioning. The predicted 
Wake Vortex Vector will be 
wrong, and an alert might be 
generated on the basis of 
false information. Most likely a 
transition will be made to the 
ICAO Separation Mode. There 
will be an increase of 
workload of ATC. 
SIGNIFICANT 
INCIDENT 
The ATC-Wake 
separation Mode is 
based on a worst case 
combination of a 
Heavy leader aircraft 
and a Light follower 
aircraft.  
Faulty or Inaccurate Meteo 
Now-casting Information:  
The now-cast meteorological 
conditions are inaccurate or 
wrong. The controllers will 
most likely not be aware of a 
sudden unfavorable change of 
the wind.  
Incorrect information is 
passed to the ATC-Wake 
Predictor, causing improper 
functioning. The predicted 
transport of the vortices is 
wrong. An unfavorable 
change of weather (not 
enough crosswind) is not 
detected. The aircraft may 
encounter severe turbulence, 
which could lead to control 
problems close to ground 
SERIOUS  
INCIDENT 
The wake vortex is 
stronger closer to the 
generating aircraft. An 
encounter with 90 
seconds (i.e. reduced) 
separation will result in 
more severe 
consequence than 
under ICAO 
separations. 
Wake Vortex outside 
Detection Range and/or 
Scanning Volume: The wake 
vortices generated by the 
leader aircraft are not 
detected, when they are 
outside the scanning volume 
of the ATC-Wake Detector. As 
the WV detection information 
suddenly disappears, there is 
an indication and ATCos will 
be informed of the failure. 
No wake vortex information is 
passed to the ATC-Wake 
Detector, causing improper 
functioning. As the ATC 
supervisor and the air traffic 
controllers will likely become 
aware quickly that there will 
not be an alert, a transition will 
be made to the ICAO 
Separation Mode. There will 
be an increase of workload of 
ATC. 
SIGNIFICANT  
INCIDENT 
It could take a few 
minutes before the 
transition to ICAO 
Mode is made. The 
aircraft already lined up 
for departure will 
receive their take off 
clearance later. 
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Description Effect Classification Comment 
Faulty or Inaccurate 
Detection of the Wake 
Vortices:  
The wake vortices generated 
by the leader aircraft are 
inaccurately or not detected, 
because of a failure of the 
ATC-Wake Detector. 
Incorrect information is used 
by ATC-Wake Detector, 
causing improper functioning. 
Wake Vortices are not or 
inaccurately detected. There 
will be an alert if the Wake 
Vortex Vector generated by 
the ATC-Wake Predictor 
indicates a potential wake 
encounter. There will be an 
increase of workload. 
SIGNIFICANT  -  
MAJOR  
INCIDENT 
Alert is generated 
because there is a 
discrepancy between 
prediction and 
detection information. 
This is unlikely to occur 
at low altitudes if 
Meteo Nowcasting and 
Predictor are working. 
 
The operational hazards associated with the ATC-Wake operation have been identified in detail 
with the NLR Qualitative Safety Assessment (QSA) methodology. Identified potential safety 
bottlenecks for ATC-Wake departure operations are e.g. [13, 21]: 
 Supervisors may not follow the advice of the ATC-Wake Separation Mode Planner and 
tend to deviate to the unsafe side, for example for efficiency reasons; 
 Controllers may not comply with the prescribed separation and give a take-off clearance 
too early, for instance due to a timing error; 
 Controllers may not pay sufficient attention to the visualisation tool and react properly on 
an alert, because tower controllers are used to work based on their outside view. 
 
A more extensive description of all the safety bottlenecks related to the ATC-Wake operation 
together with some further recommendations for risk mitigation is provided in reference 13. 
 
5.2 Quantitative risk assessment 
 
5.2.1 Wake vortex induced risk 
Figure 5-5 shows the wake vortex induced risk, in terms of incident/accident probability per 
departure, for a separation time of 90 seconds (with no head- or tailwind). Note that LAC 
denotes the leader aircraft and FAC denotes the follower aircraft (the numbering is in 
accordance with Table 4-2). Risk assessment results for cross wind conditions of 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 
and 5 m/s are provided in Figures 5-6 until 5-11 [12, 22]. Initial aircraft separation times of 60, 
90, 120, 150, and 180 seconds are all evaluated. A very important departure specific and aircraft 
dependent parameter is the lift-off point. Therefore, it is noted once more that in the assessment 
a distinction has been made between early and late lift-off of the aircraft. Logically, a variation 
of lift-off points results in a variation of departure tracks. When the follower aircraft lifts off 
early behind a leader aircraft that lifts off late, the departure path of the follower aircraft well 
exceeds that of the leader aircraft, and as a consequence the associated risks are low. To stay on 
the conservative side, the risk results are maximized over the variation in lift-off points of the 
different departing aircraft types before deriving the wake vortex induced risk results provided 
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in this Section. The full details of the quantitative safety assessment are provided in Speijker et 
al. [12, 22], in which the impact of the lift off point on risk is also analysed. In this study, the 
aim is to derive safe separation times for departures, i.e. therefore the worst case combination of 
leader and follower lift off points is considered. An interesting finding is the fact that e.g. Light 
Business Jets behind a Large Jumbo Jet could always be separated with just 60 seconds (see e.g. 
Figure 5-12, in Section 5.2.2). This is explained by the fact that this aircraft usually takes off 
earlier, which implies that its flight path well exceeds that of the leading Large Jumbo Jet. 
 
As an example, Figures 5-1 until 5-4 present the incident/accident risk curves for a Regional Jet 
departing under different crosswind conditions (no head- or tailwind) behind a Large Jumbo Jet. 
 
 
Figure 5-1  Risk with crosswind 0 m/s 
 
 
Figure 5-2  Risk with crosswind 1 m/s 
 
Figure 5-3  Risk with crosswind 2 m/s 
 
 
Figure 5-4  Risk with crosswind 3 m/s 
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Figure 5-5  Overview of risk results in case of 90 seconds separation 
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Figure 5-6  Overview of risk results in case of 0 m/s crosswind 
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Figure 5-7  Overview of risk results in case of 1 m/s crosswind 
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Figure 5-8  Overview of risk results in case of 2 m/s crosswind 
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Figure 5-9  Overview of risk results in case of 3 m/s crosswind 
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Figure 5-10  Overview of risk results in case of 4 m/s crosswind 
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Figure 5-11  Overview of risk results in case of 5 m/s crosswind 
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5.2.2 Initial estimate of the minimum required aircraft separation time 
An initial estimate of the minimum required separation times for various leader and follower 
aircraft combinations and for various crosswind conditions is provided in Figure 5-12 on the 
basis of the quantitative risk assessment results sketched in Section 5.2.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-12  Overview of WAVIR assessed safe separation minima for the SRD operation 
 
Taking into consideration that ATC-Wake Mode should be applied to all aircraft combinations, 
Table 5-2 indicates safe separation minima for certain crosswind intervals (these are indicative 
numbers that do not take into account uncertainty in the crosswind conditions, safety margins 
and other factors that may influence safety). These separations may only be applied in case 
ATC-Wake is used, and the system meets performance requirements that follow from Table 5-1. 
Reduced separation of 90 seconds may be applied when crosswind exceeds 3 m/s, while 60 
seconds separation can be applied with crosswind above 5 m/s. 
 
Table 5-2  Indicative separation per crosswind interval 
Crosswind interval Proposed wake vortex separation 
0 ≤  uc ≤  2 m/s ICAO 
2 ≤  uc ≤  3 m/s 120s 
3 ≤  uc ≤  5 m/s 90s 
5 m/s ≤  uc 60s 
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6 Capacity improvements 
To derive the potential benefits of the ATC-Wake SRD operation at an airport with average 
(wind) conditions, the statistical data on the occurrence of crosswind at an airport, the ATC-
Wake SRD separation schemes as function of crosswind, and the results from an analytical 
study [20] are combined. Expected throughput is provided in Table 6-1.  
 
Table 6-1  Expected throughput for the ATC-Wake SRD operation 
 ATC-Wake Single Runway Departure operation 
Crosswind 
interval 
Separation Throughput 
[aircraft/hour] 
Probability of 
crosswind in interval 1) 
Throughput per 
crosswind interval 
0 ≤ uc ≤ 1 ICAO 37.8 0.080 3.0 
1 ≤ uc ≤ 2 ICAO 37.8 0.208 7.9 
2 ≤ uc ≤ 3 ICAO 37.8 0.206 7.8 
3 ≤ uc ≤ 4 90s 38.9 0.164 6.4 
4 ≤ uc ≤ 5 90s 38.9 0.118 4.6 
5 ≤ uc ≤ 6 60s 40.0 0.081 3.2 
6 ≤ uc ≤ 8 60s 40.0 0.053 2.1 
8m/s ≤ uc 60s 40.0 0.090 3.6 
Expected throughput [aircraft/hour] 38.6 
Change compared to ICAO reference situation 2.1% 
 
Runway throughput improves when the ATC-Wake system/operation is used. Depending on the 
occurrence of favorable crosswind conditions, the increase in runway throughput is estimated at 
about 2% for the ATC-Wake SRD operation at a generic airport with average wind conditions. 
 
 
 
                                                     
1)  A crosswind climatology based on about 400,000 observations at about 10 m altitude at 3 large European airports is used. 
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7 Conclusions and recommendations 
With the steady increase in air traffic, airports are under continuous pressure to increase aircraft 
handling capacity. One potential approach is to reduce the wake vortex separation distance 
between aircraft at take-off and landing without compromising safety. The EC project ATC-
Wake has designed an integrated system for Air Traffic Control that would allow variable 
aircraft separation distances, as opposed to the fixed distances presently applied at airports. 
Introducing and/or planning changes to the ATM system cannot be done without providing 
sufficiently validated evidence that minimum safety requirements will be satisfied. Therefore, 
this study has quantified the possible safety implications related to installation of ATC-Wake. 
This includes an assessment of required crosswind values for which reduced aircraft separation 
can be applied. The wake vortex induced risk between a variety of leader and follower aircraft, 
departing under various wind conditions, has been evaluated with the Wake Vortex Induced 
Risk assessment (WAVIR) methodology and toolset. For the ATC-Wake departure operation 
with reduced separation, two main issues have been considered: 
• The controller working with ATC-Wake will warn the pilot about a potential wake vortex 
encounter, in case an ATC-Wake alert is raised. 
• If an ATC-Wake system provides wrong advice, there is a higher risk on the presence of 
severe wake vortices. Consequences might even be catastrophic when reduced separation is 
applied and a light aircraft encounters a severe wake of a heavy aircraft. 
 
The present separation of two to three minutes between departing aircraft is designed to ensure 
that aircraft will not encounter wake vortices of large aircraft. For airports with ATC-Wake in 
use, the present study indicates that the time separation between aircraft departing at single 
runways might be reduced to 90 seconds for all aircraft types in the presence of sufficient 
crosswind. Indicative separation minima dependent on crosswind conditions have been 
determined. As these separation minima do not yet account for crosswind uncertainty, the 
setting of requirements for the ATC-Wake system was further investigated. This was done 
through a qualitative analysis of the effect of failures of the ATC-Wake system. It appears that 
the most severe failure conditions are related to the functioning of the Monitoring and Alerting 
system and the Meteorological Now-casting systems. These system components are crucial and 
sufficient accuracy and reliability shall be guaranteed. Additionally, it is noted that controllers 
should be made very aware that a timely warning to the pilots is also crucial (safety training 
might help to increase the awareness). A sufficiently validated aircraft performance and 
dynamics model for departures is not yet available. It is therefore recommended to extend the 
well known AMAAI toolset (developed for EUROCONTROL) for the analysis of in trail 
following aircraft during arrivals with a module dedicated to departure operations [16]. A 
further issue to be investigated is the fact that the actual (real) separation time at the start of roll 
of the aircraft will usually not be exactly the same as the advised separation time.  
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A full Safety Case for ATC-Wake departures shall also account for the local weather 
climatology and ATC/pilot procedures for wake vortex mitigation. In view of this, actual 
implementation of the ATC-Wake operation at European airports is not envisaged in the short 
term. It is recommended to involve airport authorities and ATC centers for gathering the 
required data to build the Safety Case. Follow-up research is foreseen to be performed as part of 
the CREDOS project, which is a logical successor to the ATC-Wake project. 
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